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Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class
Representatives in Class Actions
by
JEAN WEGMAN BuRNs*
The role of the class representative in class actions has become
something of an enigma. On a doctrinal level, the Supreme Court at
times has treated the named plaintiff as the pivotal figure in the class
lawsuit, with the fate of the entire action rising or falling with the
status of the representative. Yet, at other times the Court in effect has
reduced the representative to nothing more than a figurehead with
little or no function. On a practical level, both courts and commen-
tators increasingly acknowledge that the latter view is closer to reality:
the named plaintiff plays almost no role in the actual prosecution of
the class action, leaving this function for the class attorney.
The time has come to ask a fundamental question: Do we really
need the class representative-the named plaintiff-in a class action?'
Ironically, while veritable volumes have been written about the class
action, 2 this basic question has never been raised. To find an answer,
two related inquiries must be addressed: (1) Is the class representative
serving any useful doctrinal or practical function? (2) If not, is his
presence doing any harm? This Article suggests that the class rep-
resentative serves no useful purpose and that we would be better off
without him.
Some skeptics, no doubt, will respond quickly that this is a far-
fetched, radical notion that would require rewriting Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23) and restructuring the entire
class action practice. This Article explains that only modest changes
would be required in Rule 23. Critics should note that we are only
* Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.A. 1970, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity; J.D. 1973, University of Chicago.
1. Professor Willborn, for instance, has stated: "Under Rule 23 ... a class action
without a class representative is like one hand clapping. The concept simply is not contemplated
by the Rule." Willborn, Personal Stake, Rule 23, and the Employment Discrimination Class
Action, 22 B.C.L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1980).
2. No attempt will be made in this Article to catalogue all the numerous books and
articles written about the class action. The treatises include: 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1987); 1 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS (2d ed. 1985); 7A-C C. WmoRH, A. MILLER &
M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D (1986); S. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL
GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
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talking about a rule of procedure, not a holy writ handed down un-
changed from one generation to the next. Congress and the states have
seen fit to amend even the United States Constitution.3 Furthermore,
the proposal made here would not require major changes in either class
action doctrine or practice. To the contrary, the class representative
has been eliminated already from much class action doctrine and plays
little role in practice. Indeed, this Article contends that not only does
the class representative serve no useful function, but, moreover, class
actions would benefit from eliminating the named plaintiff. The ben-
efits are threefold: first, eliminating the class representative will help
bring much-needed consistency to class action jurisprudence; second,
it will encourage courts to direct their attention toward the real prob-
lems associated with class litigation; and third, it will eliminate a num-
ber of phantom issues on which courts and litigants currently waste
an inordinate amount of time.
Given the novelty of this proposal, I have tried to anticipate the
questions and retorts of "the skeptic." Part I answers the skeptic's
first question: Why should we even consider tampering with the class
representative? The class action seems to be operating quite nicely, and
"if it ain't broke, why fix it?" Part I explains that although the class
action may be functioning, there is still considerable room for im-
provement. The class representative in particular is "broken" on both
a doctrinal and a practical level. Doctrinally, the class representative
has taken on a "now-you-see-him, now-you-don't" aura: at times his
presence and his individual claim are regarded as central to the con-
tinuation of the lawsuit; yet, at other times his status and the status
of his individual claim are wholly ignored. In practice, he has been
reduced to little more than an admission ticket to the courthouse and
one anecdotal example of the class claim. Class counsel does all major
planning and makes the critical litigation decisions. Part II of the Ar-
3. Nonetheless, some commentators are firmly against making any changes beyond "fine
tuning" to Rule 23. See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the "Class Action Problem, " 92 HAzv. L. REv. 664, 682-93 (1979). Other commentators
have proposed modifying Rule 23 to make it more useful in mass tort cases. See, e.g., Coffee,
Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 625-26 (1987)
[hereinafter Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action] (summarizing the various proposals that have
been made); Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure
Act, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right? Suggested
Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation,
25 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 461 (1988). An American Bar Association committee also has put
forward suggestions for revising Rule 23. Report and Recommendations of the Special Com-
mittee on Class Action Improvements, 110 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195 (1986). None of these
proposals, however, deals with the question posed in this Article: Should we eliminate the
class representative?
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ticle explores how these problems can be solved if the class represen-
tative is eliminated. Not only can class action jurisprudence be made
consistent and coherent, but additionally by eliminating the class rep-
resentative a court is confronted with reality: the class action is not
simply a large traditional lawsuit, but rather is group litigation with
problems and concerns different from those in the traditional two-party
lawsuit. Additionally, without a class representative, the court will
avoid wasting its time and efforts on phantom issues that arise solely
because Rule 23 tries to force the class action into the traditional bi-
polar litigation model through the class representative. Finally, Part
III sets out a summary of the proposal. In brief, the proposal is to
eliminate the class representative and treat the class as the real party
to the lawsuit. All standing and mootness issues would be decided by
reference to the status of the class's claim, not the status of one in-
dividual's claim. To insure that the class claim was a concrete, con-
tested issue that class members wanted resolved, and to insure that
any jurisdictional requirements were met, class counsel would be re-
quired to present "exemplary class members" as part of the certifi-
cation process. Such exemplary class members, however, simply would
be members of the class, and the fate of the class claim would not
automatically rise or fall with the fates of the exemplary class mem-
bers. In addition, to insure adequate supervision of class counsel,
counsel would be required to present at the certification hearing pro-
posed "class monitors." These monitors, who would not necessarily
be class members, could be institutions or individuals. The key would
be finding people or entities willing to and capable of supervising the
class counsel. In sum, the thrust of the proposal is to attack directly
the real problems generated by the class action and to get away from
phantom issues that exist precisely because Rule 23, by its use of a
class representative, lulis us into believing that the class action is sim-
ply a traditional lawsuit in a larger package.
I. The Problem: The Role of the
Class Representative Today
A. Class Action Doctrine
Class action jurisprudence is confused and inconsistent when it
comes to defining the role of the class representative. Superficially,
the class representative plays an obvious part: he is the party bringing
(or occasionally defending) the lawsuit. He fills the same position
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that the plaintiff (or defendant) in the traditional two-party lawsuit
fills. 4 Yet, this analysis is just that: superficial. Apart from filling
a space on the caption of the complaint, the purpose served by the
named plaintiff's presence remains a largely unanswered question.
The most significant-and at the same time, most confusing-
area of involvement for the class representative is in evaluating stand-
ing and mootness.5 The confusion here can be traced to two con-
flicting and fundamentally irreconcilable approaches used by the
United States Supreme Court in resolving class action standing and
mootness issues.
6
In one line of cases, the Court treated the named plaintiff as
the pivotal character in the class lawsuit. 7 In these cases, the failure
of the named plaintiff's individual claim meant the failure of the
entire class action. In Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs, for
instance, the Court held that when the named plaintiff's individual
4. In the vast majority of class actions, the class and the class representative are the
plaintiffs. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 3.02, at 133; Comment, Defendant Class Actions
and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 284 (1985) (authored by Angelo
N. Ancheta). Because this is the typical scenario, it will be assumed for the purposes of this
Article that the class is prosecuting rather than defending the law suit.
5. As many commentators have lamented, the law of standing and mootness in general
is confusing and inconsistent. See, e.g., Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of
Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 39-41; Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1379-82 (1973); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REv. 68, 68-73 (1984); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 660-69 (1973); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Aban-
donment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663-64 (1977). Some scholars attribute this, at least in
part, to the manipulative quality of the injury-in-fact test. See, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme
Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV.
4, 16-23 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE
L.J. 221, 231-33 (1988); Nichol, supra, at 74-82; Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1448-66 (1988).
6. For a detailed description of the Supreme Court decisions relating to class action
standing and mootness, see Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1239, 1242-62 (1989). See also Bledsoe, Mootness and
Standing in Class Actions, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 430 (1973) (class action is moot only when
the entire class's interests are moot, and a class representative who has standing when a class
suit is filed will not be deprived of such standing when the representative's claim subsequently
becomes moot); Champlin, Personal Stake and Justiciability: Application to the Moot Class
Action, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 85 (1978) (questioning whether the personal stake requirement
for class representation is a valid means for insuring justiciability values-values that need
clarification themselves); Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts:
Part Two-Class Actions, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1320 (1976) (authored by James M. Summers)
(exploring the principles that determine whether a class action will continue after the named
representative's claim becomes moot).
7. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). Hereinafter, I will refer to this approach as the
"Jacobs" approach.
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claim was mooted before class certification, the entire lawsuit had
to be dismissed, regardless of whether the issue remained "alive" for
the class.8 Similarly, in other cases, when the named plaintiff failed
to allege injury to himself, the entire action fell, 9 even though the
district court had certified a class and awarded class-wide relief.10
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that if the named plain-
tiff's claims failed on the merits before class certification, the class
allegations must be dismissed because no "class" could exist apart
from the class representative prior to certification."
In each of these class actions, the Supreme Court applied a tra-
ditional "personal stake" approach to standing and mootness de-
veloped in nonclass lawsuits: in order to bring an action, the plaintiff
had to allege a "personal stake" in the outcome of the case.' 2 The
Court then looked to the class representative to fulfill this standing
8. Jacobs, 420 U.S. at 129-30. The Court reached the same result in Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1976), and in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S.
147, 149 (1975). Some commentators argue that Jacobs, Weinstein, and Spangler can be read
more narrowly and point out that in these cases there were no proper class certifications before
or after the named plaintiffs' claims became moot. See Greenstein, Bridging the Mootness
Gap in Federal Court Class Actions, 35 STA. L. REv. 897, 910 (1983); Kane, Standing,
Mootness, and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 Busu'Aio L. REv. 83, 106 (1976-
77).
9. O'Shea, 414 U.S. 488. The Supreme Court used the same rationale to deny standing
in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
10. Blum, 457 U.S. at 997-98; see also Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 399-403 (the class allegations
were stricken even though the court of appeals had certified a class and found class-wide
liability).
11. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403-04. Although the Court analyzed the issue in Rodriguez
in terms of Rule 23 rather than Article III, the decision was nonetheless essentially a standing
or mootness decision. Under the current law, Article III standing and Rule 23 are separate
but intertwined concepts. Standing, in the sense of a personal stake and a concrete issue, is a
requirement in all actions, class and nonclass. Once the individual has satisfied this threshold
standing requirement, the issue in the class action is whether he may assert the-rights of the
class in addition to his own rights. The question of whether he may assert class rights depends
on whether he has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, §
2.05, at 48, § 2.07, at 53-54. In Rodriguez the Supreme Court held that the named plaintiffs
who failed to prove the merits of their individual employment discrimination claims failed to
meet the Rule 23(a) requirement that a representative be a member of the class that he seeks
to represent. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403. This very issue of continued membership in the class
is, however, also the standing and mootness question.
12. The personal stake test for standing in nonclass cases was articulated in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-106 (1968). In these cases
the Court viewed the plaintiffs personal stake as causally linked to the goal of standing:
"concrete adverseness."
The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party' seeking relief has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).
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requirement. If the class representative failed to satisfy the personal
stake requirement, there was no Article III case or controversy and
the entire case had to be dismissed, 3 even in the face of an obvious
"class" of persons for whom the issue continued to be very much
alive.
In a second line of cases, however, the Supreme Court largely
ignored the class representative and focused on the class element of
the class action to resolve standing and mootness questions. 4 The
Court recognized that declaring the named plaintiff's individual claim
moot in no way diminished the real and live issue between the class
and the defendant. In Sosna v. Iowa, for instance, the Court held
that once there was certification, the class could supply the personal
stake necessary for Article III standing.' 5 Later, in Gerstein v. Pugh
and United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, the Court carried
this doctrine further by permitting the class actions to continue even
though the representatives' claims dropped out before class certifi-
cation. 16
13. As Justice White stated in O'Shea: "[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to
represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none
may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class." 414 U.S. at 494. The
Court echoed this in Blum, stating that the named plaintiffs "must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members
of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent." 457 U.S. at 1001
n.13 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)). See also Jacobs, 420 U.S. at 129
(class action by members of high school newspaper dismissed as named representatives had
since graduated); Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 148 (action against parole board alleging class entitled
to procedural rights in parole hearings declared moot when respondent paroled); Spangler, 427
U.S. at 430 (case moot for respondent high school students since they had since graduated).
In Jacobs, Weinstein and Spangler, the court did not use the "personal stake" language or
discuss dismissal specifically in terms of Article III. In each, the court evidently thought that
mootness obviously resulted in dismissal and that further comment was unnecessary.
14. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Hereinafter, I will refer to this
approach as the "Sosna-Geraghty" approach.
15. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 397-403. The following term, in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976), the Court made it clear that the holding of Sosna was not limited
to intrinsically transitory claims. According to the Sosna Court, when the district court certified
the class, "the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status
separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff]." Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399. Thereafter
the case or controversy requirement of a "personal stake" was satisfied by the certified class's
continuing controversy with the defendant. "The controversy may exist ... between a named
defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the
claim of the named plaintiff has become moot." Id. at 402.
16. The Court justified this result in Gerstein on the ground that the class claim was
transitory and in the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" category. Gerstein, 420 U.S.
at 110 n.11. The Court noted that "the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the
deprivation is certain" and that the Court could "safely assume" that the lawyer representing
the class (a public defender) "has other clients with a continuing live interest in the case."
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In contrast to the Court's traditional approach used in Jacobs,
with its emphasis on the class representative, the Court employed a
function and class-oriented approach to standing and mootness prob-
lems in this second line of cases .17 Acknowledging that the class ac-
tion is a "nontraditional form[] of litigation,"' 8 the Court looked
to whether the purported function of standing-"concrete adverse-
ness"-was present. 19 Finding a "sharply presented issue[] in a con-
crete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating
opposing positions," the Geraghty Court concluded that the standing
requirement of Article III was satisfied.2° Thus, while continuing to
pay lip service to the "personal stake" requirement, the Court shifted
its focus to the class and absent class members, even before certi-
fication, to provide the necessary personal stake or concrete ad-
verseness .
21
Id. at 111 n.11.
The Supreme Court previously had used the "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception in nonclass cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123-25 (1973). The rationale
for this exception in nonclass actions is that the litigant, facing some likelihood of becoming
involved in the same controversy in the future, can be expected to prosecute the case with
rigorous advocacy. Champlin, supra note 6, at 88-89. Thus, in the nonclass action, it is
routinely required that the plaintiff himself will likely face the same injury in the future. See,
e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983). See generally Donaldson, A Search
for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part One-The Continuing Impact Doctrines,
54 TEx. L. Ray. 1289, 1291-1308 (1976). In applying the exception to class actions, however,
the Gerstein Court emphasized the absent class members rather than the named plaintiff.
While the plaintiff in the nonclass case must show that he will likely face the same injury in
the future, the Gerstein Court suggested that there is no such requirement in a class action.
The exception would apply if the absent class members would likely suffer repeated injuries,
even when there was no indication that the named plaintiff would suffer any repetition of the
injury. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. The Supreme Court used the Gerstein exception in two
other cases involving transitory class claims. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.3
(1984); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978).
In Geraghty, the Court rested its decision on the theory that the named plaintiff retained a
live interest in the class certification question even though his claim on the merits was moot.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 401-04. "The question whether class certification is appropriate remains
as a concrete, sharply presented issue[,]" and since Geraghty "continues vigorously to advocate
his right to have a class certified[, he] retains a 'personal stake' in obtaining class certification
sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined." Id. at 403-04.
17. As Professor Chayes noted, the Court in Sosna "came close to recognizing the class
itself as the litigating entity." Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 40.
18. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402.
19. In East v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court stated that the goal of standing was
to insure "concrete adverseness" between the parties, which in turn would "sharpen[: the
presentation" of the issue. Id. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). But
while O'Shea, Jacobs, and Rodriguez relied upon the named plaintiffs personal stake to
guarantee this "concrete adverseness," Geraghty stated that "vigorous advocacy can be assured
through means other than the traditional requirement of a 'personal stake in the outcome."'
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404.
20. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 403.
21. Although Geraghty spoke of the named plaintiff retaining a personal stake in the
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Under this functional approach, the role of the class represen-
tative essentially was reduced to figurehead status. Here, in contrast
to the procedure used in traditional cases, the Court permitted the
named plaintiff to continue to "represent" the class, even though
the plaintiff no longer had anything personally to gain or lose in the
litigation. The Court justified this result by finding continued ad-
equate representation in the representative's vigorous advocacy of
class interests. 22 As Justice White noted in his Sosna dissent, how-
ever, any such vigorous advocacy was clearly more attributable to
the class attorney than to the class representative:
[The named plaintiff] retains no real interest whatsoever in this con-
troversy, certainly not an interest that would have entitled her to
be a plaintiff in the first place, either alone or as representing a
class. In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the case,
no member of the class before the Court. The unresolved issue, the
attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants remain.... The Court
in reality holds that an attorney's competence in presenting his case,
evaluated post hoc through a review of his performance as revealed
by the record, fulfills the "case or controversy" mandate.23
In dealing with class action standing and mootness problems,
the Supreme Court has vacillated between the traditional approach
and the functional approach. Significantly, the Court never has aban-
doned either; 24 moreover, it has made no attempt to reconcile these
fundamentally inconsistent lines of cases. 25 Instead, the jurisprudence
of class action standing and mootness has been left as a thicket of
jumbled, disconnected rules. 26
class certification issue, id. at 401-04, the result can be seen as permitting the uncertified class
to supply the personal stake, just as Sosna had allowed a certified class to do. See Greenstein,
supra note 8, at 915. Moreover, Gerstein specifically relied on the existence of absent class
members with live claims to justify its result. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.II (1975).
22. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975).
23. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 412-13 (White, J., dissenting).
24. The two lines of cases enjoy a peaceful coexistence. The Supreme Court often does
not even cite troublesome decisions from the opposing line of cases, or if it does, disposes of
them summarily. In Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 400 n.7, for example, the majority found standing
to exist and relegated Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs and its progeny to a footnote,
even though each of these cases had dealt specifically with precertification mootness issues.
The Court characterized these cases as "adopting a less flexible approach," and the Court
completely ignored East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez. Id. On the other
hand, in Blum the Court held, in a post-trial situation, that standing was not established and
that part of the class claims had to be dismissed; the Court based its decision on O'Shea,
without explaining how the result in Blum (dismissal of claims for which a class had been
certified and for which relief had been granted) could be reconciled with the rationale of
Geraghty and its emphasis on the function of standing. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000-
02 (1982).
25. A few commentators have attempted to reconcile the cases but largely agree that any
such reconciliation is simply formalistic. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 6, at 1276-77; Chayes,
Foreword, supra note 5, at 44-45.
26. The rules can be summarized as follows:
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Outside the standing and mootness area, the Supreme Court has
been equally ambivalent about the role of the class representative in
fulfilling procedural requirements. Here too, the Court has tended
to resolve issues on a case-by-case basis, without providing any over-
arching doctrinal theory. 27 Consistent with the "traditional" ap-
proach, the Court at times has focused on the named representative
and required that he satisfy various procedural requirements, such
as diversity of citizenship, personal jurisdiction, or exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 2 At other times, however, the Court has
(1) Before certification, if the named plaintiff's individual claim becomes moot, the entire
action must be dismissed, even in the face of an obvious "certified" class for whom relief
has been granted (O'Shea, Jacobs, Rodriguez, and Blum). See supra notes 7-13 and accom-
panying text.
(2) However, rule (1) does not apply if the claim is transitory and capable of repetition within
the class. In this latter situation, a named plaintiff whose claim is declared moot before
certification can continue to represent the class on the class certification issue and on the
merits (Gerstein). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
(3) Rule (1) also does not apply if the named plaintiff, before his claim is declared moot,
moves for class certification. If the named plaintiff is successful in getting the class certified,
he can continue to represent the class on the merits despite lacking an individual claim of his
own (Sosna). See supra note 15 and accompanying text. If the named plaintiff is unsuccessful
in getting the class certified, he can at least continue to represent the class in appealing the
class certification question; and if eventually successful, he possibly can represent the class on
the merits (Geraghty).
The inconsistency between the precertification mootness rule (rule (1)) and the postcertifi-
cation mootness rule (rule (3)) has been explored. See Bums, supra note 6, at 1263-80;
Greenstein, supra note 8, at 909-15; Willborn, supra note 1, at 14-24. With regard to rules
(2) and (3), Professor Greenstein concludes: "In terms of the case-or-controversy analysis of
Sosna and Franks, ... the Gerstein result is incomprehensible." Greenstein, supra note 8, at
905.
27. Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 28-36; Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or
Representational Device., 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 459, 482-97.
28. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (personal jurisdiction);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (only representative parties need
file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in a Title VII class action); Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (diversity of citizenship) (overruled on other
grounds). Whether the courts look to the representative to exhaust administrative remedies or
require that each absent class member also exhaust these remedies varies with the underlying
statute. In Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that
all class members must make filings under the Social Security Act. Similarly, courts have held
that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, each absent class member must meet the administrative
filing requirements. Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 227 (8th Cir. 1977); Pennsylvania
v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975). These latter cases, in
which the focus is on the entire class and the named plaintiff is given no special role, are
consistent with the "functional" approach of the standing and mootness cases.
It is also interesting to note that, although Shutts looked to the named plaintiff's personal
jurisdiction, the Court repeatedly and uniformly referred to the absent class members as
"plaintiffs." Shutts, 472 U.S. 797"passim. For discussions of Shutts, see Kennedy, The
Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the
State Multistate Class Action, 34 U. KAN. L. Rav. 255 (1985); Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96
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used the "functional" approach and focused on the absent class
members, treating them even before certification as "parties" to the
lawsuit. The Court has held, for instance, that each class member
must satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. 29 The Court also
has held that the statute of limitations is tolled for the absent class
members from the time the complaint is filed until the district court
denies class certification.30 And in another decision, the Court al-
lowed an absent "class member" of an uncertified class to intervene,
years after the denial of class certification, in order to appeal the
certification question.31 The common theme running through these
latter decisions is the assumption that the absent class members are
"parties" to the lawsuit on an equal standing with the class rep-
resentative before certification is granted, and to some extent, even
after certification is denied. 32
Given the Supreme Court's failure to develop a single, philo-
sophically consistent approach to the respective roles of the class rep-
resentative and absent class members, the lower courts have created
a confusing hodgepodge of class action case law. Although the courts
have been applying the present Rule 23 for more than twenty years,
no coherent jurisprudence of class actions has emerged. Rather, as
evidenced by the courts' handling of three key class action ques-
tions-(1) precertification mootness of the named plaintiff, (2) post-
trial inadequacy of the named plaintiff, and (3) precertification set-
tlement by the named plaintiff-the class action doctrine developed
by the lower courts simply reflects and magnifies the confusion found
in the Supreme Court decisions. 33
YALE L.J. 1 (1986); Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597
(1987).
29. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S 291, 301 (1973).
30. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). The absent class members
were "parties to the suit until and unless they received notice thereof and chose not to
continue." Id. at 551. For a detailed discussion of American Pipe, see Wheeler, Predismissal
Notice and Statutes of Limitations in Federal Class Actions After American Pipe and Con-
struction Co. v. Utah, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 771 (1975).
31. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 391-96 (1977). The dissenting justices
in McDonald appropriately noted that "[p]ervading the Court's opinion is the assumption that
the class action somehow continued after the District Court denied class status." Id. at 399
(Powell, J., dissenting).
32. Most recently, in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989), the
Supreme Court treated absent class members in an opt-in class as "parties" before class
certification. The Court held that a district court, pursuant to its "managerial responsibility"
over class actions, could facilitate notice to potential members of an opt-in class. Id. at 486.
As the dissenting justices noted, however, because this was an opt-in class, the people to
whom the notice was sent were not yet "parties" to the action and had no cases to be
managed. Id. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. For a detailed analysis of the lower court cases in these three areas, see Burns, supra
note 6, at 1263-85.
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In the area of precertification mootness (in which the named
plaintiff's claim is declared moot before class certification), most
lower courts follow the traditional Jacobs approach and hold that
the entire class action must be dismissed despite injury to absent "class
members" and the likelihood of duplicative litigation.14 Yet a few
courts recognize that even in the precertification mootness situation,
there may be a live and sharply-contested issue between the class and
the defendant, and under the Sosna-Geraghty functional approach,
standing could be satisfied by focusing on the interest of the absent
class members. 5
When faced with post-trial mootness or inadequacy of the named
plaintiff, 36 a number of courts wholly abandon the traditional ap-
proach and follow the Sosna-Geraghty class-oriented approach. In
contrast with the traditional approach typically used in precertifi-
cation cases, these courts find that because the function of standing
is satisfied through the presence of a sharply-presented, factually-
concrete, and vigorously-litigated issue, the "class" findings on the
34. See, e.g., Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 869 (5th Cir. 1990); Tucker v. Phyfer, 819
F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1410, 1417-
19 (7th Cir. 1985); Kennerly v. United States, 721 F.2d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 1983); Inmates
of Lincoln Intake & Detention Facility v. Boosalis, 705 F.2d 1021, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 1983);
Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 686 F.2d 1278, 1289 (8th Cir. 1982); Swan v.
Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97, 102 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980); Cicchetti v. Lucey, 514 F.2d 362, 366-67 (1st
Cir. 1975); Cokley v. Hayden, 731 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (D. Kan. 1990). Ironically (and perhaps
as evidence of their confusion), a number of these courts rely on Geraghty in reaching their
decision. See, e.g., Tucker, 819 F.2d at 1033; Kennerly, 721 F.2d at 1260.
35. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1987); Zeidman v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. Tully, 99 F.R.D. 632, 638-
44 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
36. This situation arises when the district court, believing the named plaintiff to be a
proper representative, certifies the class and tries the case, but later determines that, as a
matter of law, the named plaintiff could not represent the class on part or all of its claims.
In the past, the situation often arose when an employee brought an employment discrimination
class action under an "across-the-board" theory. The theory was that the plaintiff employee
who suffered one type of employment discrimination could represent a class asserting other,
different types of employment discrimination. For instance, the employee discriminated against
in a promotion decision may represent a class of applicants denied employment as well as a
class of employees who, like himself, were denied promotions. See, e.g., Crockett v. Green,
534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975). In General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147
(1982), the Supreme Court held that such across-the-board actions violated Rule 23 to the
extent the class representative was not a member of the class he sought to represent. Prior to
the decision in Falcon, a number of district courts had permitted named plaintiffs to represent
broad employment classes under across-the-board theories. In light of Falcon, however, the
courts of appeals later held the across-the-board approach to be inapplicable as a matter of
law, and consequently, there were no class representatives for part of the class claims. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 121-26 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 656 (1987), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988); Hill v. Western Elec.
Co., 672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982).
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merits can stand even though the class representative is found later
to have been legally inadequate.3 These courts reason that to do oth-
erwise would needlessly hurt the successful class and result in du-
plicative litigation.38 The inadequacy of the named plaintiff is only
a "technical" failure that should not be determinative of the out-
come of the case.39 As the Third Circuit stated, "it is counsel for
the class who has the laboring oar" in "shap[ing] the claims for ad-
judication," and the class representatives simply "furnish the factual
basis to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and provide the outline
of the controversy." '40
While such a functional, class-oriented approach to the post-trial
inadequacy problem is fully consistent with the philosophy of Sosna,
Gerstein, and Geraghty, it directly contradicts the traditional Jacobs
approach. According to the latter approach, when the class repre-
sentative lacks a personal stake, the district court has no jurisdiction
and there can be no "class" or "class findings," regardless of how
successful the "class" was. 41
A third issue, precertification settlement by the named plaintiff,
further confounds class action jurisprudence. Here, the primary
question is whether Rule 23(e), 42 which requires court approval for
37. See, e.g., Goodman, 777 F.2d at 124; Hill, 672 F.2d at 388-92; Thurston v. Dekle,
531 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978). See also
Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (3d Cir. 1977) (the class lawyer continued to
litigate for the class after the named plaintiff effectively withdrew from the case). In Thurston,
the Fifth Circuit held that the purpose of standing was satisfied because both parties and the
district court had believed that the named plaintiff had standing. Thurston, 531 F.2d at 1270.
Although the court openly acknowledged that "[u]se of the conventional form of standing
analysis leads to the conclusion that this case should be reversed because no named plaintiff
had standing," it concluded that doing so would "exalt[] form over substance." Id.
38. See, e.g., Goodman, 777 F.2d at 124; Hill, 672 F.2d at 386; Thurston, 531 F.2d at
1270-71.
39. The Fourth Circuit observed in Hill that the finding of inadequacy of the class
representative had been based merely on a "technical lack of identity of interest and injury
between representative and class," as opposed to an "actual" ineffectiveness of representation.
Hill, 672 F.2d at 389. The court concluded that the named plaintiff's "actual effectiveness"
was seen in the favorable result on the class claims. Id. at 391.
40. Goodman, 777 F.2d at 124. Given the small role actually played by the named plaintiff
in the class action, the court concluded that there was a "distinct possibility that the evidence
presented would not have varied one iota had a qualified representative for each claim been
present from the inception of the suit." Id.
41. In keeping with the traditional approach, some courts have held that in the post-trial
inadequacy situation, the entire action must be dismissed, even though there has been a trial
in which the "class" has won on the merits of its claims. See, e.g., Berger v. Iron Workers
Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1409-11 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3155 (1989); Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482-84 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1005 (1988); Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 726 F.2d 136, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 827 (1984).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) states: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
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the dismissal or compromise of a "class action," applies when no
class has been certified and the named plaintiff is settling only his
individual claim. 43 In dealing with this issue, lower courts have over-
whelmingly held that even before certification, a "class" exists for
purposes of Rule 23(e) and therefore any settlement, even of indi-
vidual claims, requires court approval. 44 In justifying this result, courts
typically speak of the need to protect the absent "class members"
who may be prejudiced by the. named plaintiff's settlement of his
individual claims. 45
Such an assumed existence of the class and concern for prejudice
to the absent "members" of the uncertified class is in sharp contrast
to and fundamentally irreconcilable with the precertification mootness
cases, in which most courts dismiss the entire action, regardless of the
obviousness of the "class" or the magnitude of the detriment to absent
class members. 46 Yet, the same court that follows a strict traditional
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall
be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
43. Rule 23(e) clearly applies'to cases in which the class has been certified or in which
class claims are being settled (before or after certification). 7B C. Wuorr, A. MILLER & M.
KANE, supra note 2, § 1797 (collecting cases).
44. See, e.g., Diaz v. Trust Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1406-08 (9th Cir.
1989); Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1986); Simer v. Rios,
661 F.2d 655, 664-66 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982); Lawrence v. Pickens
(In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig.), 109 F.R.D. 602, 607 (D. Del. 1986); Larkin Gen. Hosp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 F.R.D. 497, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wallican v. Waterloo
Community School Dist., 80 F.R.D. 492, 493 (N.D. Iowa 1978). Contra Shelton v. Pargo,
Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1303-06, 1314-16 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that Rule 23(e) does not apply
but that the district court should nonetheless review the precertification settlement of the
representative's individual claims). For commentaries on this issue, see Almond, Settling Rule
23 Class Actions at the Precertification Stage: Is Notice Required?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 303 (1978);
Schuster, Precertification Settlement of Class Actions: Will California Follow the Federal
Lead?, 40 HAsnrNos L.J. 863 (1989).
A different settlement issue that arises with some frequency in class actions is: May a
defendant contact absent "class members" and settle with them before class certification, or
are they "parties" who only may be contacted through the class attorney? Interestingly, in
answering this question, some courts hold the absent "class members" are not parties and
may be contacted. See Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics and
Judicial Responses, 71 KY. L.J. 787, 820-23 (1982-83) (collecting cases).
45. Diaz, 876 F.2d at 1406-08; Glidden, 808 F.2d at 627; Simer, 661 F.2d at 664-66;
Lawrence, 109 F.R.D. at 607; Larkin Gen. Hosp., 93 F.R.D. at 500; Wallican, 80 F.R.D. at
493; Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MIcH. L. Rav. 308, 314-19 (1985) (authored by Sylvia R.
Lazos).
46. See, e.g., Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 (lth Cir. 1987); Davis v. Ball
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1410, 1417-19 (7th Cir. 1985); Kennedy v. United States,
721 F.2d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 1983); Inmates of Lincoln Intake & Detention Facility v.
Boosalis, 705 F.2d 1021, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 1983); Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics,
686 F.2d 1278, 1289 (8th Cir. 1982); Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97, 102 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980);
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approach when the named plaintiff's individual claims become moot
before certification generally is willing to "assume" the existence of
a class and protect that class if the named plaintiff settles before cer-
tification .47
In short, despite twenty years of using Rule 23, neither the Su-
preme Court nor the lower courts have developed a consistent or co-
herent class action jurisprudence. Sometimes, the Supreme Court has
followed a traditional approach, emphasizing the status of the named
plaintiff, and at other times it has used a functional, class-oriented
approach practically dispensing with the named plaintiff. Given the
fundamental inconsistency of these two approaches, the lower courts
also have failed to develop a unified class action doctrine. Instead,
lower courts typically have compartmentalized the various class action
issues and treated each issue as distinct and unrelated to other class
action issues. 48 The result is a crazy quilt of case law with no con-
sistency or cross reference from one issue to another.
Cicchetti v. Lucey, 514 F.2d 362, 366-67 (1st Cir. 1975); K v. Complaints Comm., 618 F.
Supp. 307, 312-13 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
47. A court may use the traditional, class-representative approach to precertification
mootness and yet use a functional, class-oriented approach to post-trial inadequacy or precer-
tification settlement problems. Compare Davis, 753 F.2d 1410 (decertification affirmed and
class action dismissed when the named representatives settled their claims with a hospital and
no longer could show a personal stake in the existing controversy) with Glidden, 808 F.2d 621
(appeal dismissed when the granting of a summary judgment to the defendant prior to a class
certification did not equate to a final judgment for appellate jurisdictional purposes). In the
post-trial inadequacy situation, some circuits appear to be on both sides of the issue. Compare
Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976) (based on the peculiar facts, the court found
the required standing in the class representative when an adversative context existed throughout
the entire proceedings, although standing subsequently was mooted by a jurisdictional change
in the law), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 901 (1978) with Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l
Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (5th Cir.) (certification vacated and case remanded because the
class representatives' asserted claims were not typical of their personal claims), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
There is superficial logic in this approach. The likelihood of prejudice to the "class" is
much greater when the named plaintiff settles his own claims than when the named plaintiff's
claims are declared moot before certification. The risk is greater because of the appearance
that he and class counsel are "selling out" the class claims in return for a larger personal
settlement. A court, concerned about prejudice to the "absent class," therefore might be more
cautious in the settlement situation than in the mootness situation. Similarly, there is a
substantially greater chance of harm to the class in a post-trial inadequacy situation (when the
class has "won") than in a precertification mootness case when little effort has been expended.
Here again, this may account for a court being more protective of the class in one situation
(post-trial inadequacy) than in another (precertification mootness). Any attempted rationali-
zation of these cases, however, is flawed because it fails to take into account the teachings of
O'Shea and Blum: Absent class certification, there is no "class" to be protected no matter
how great the prejudice or how substantial the savings in terms of judicial economy. And in
light of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), until there is a
valid class certification, the class complaint tolls the statute of limitations for all absent class
members. Id. at 552-53.
48. Two other class action issues that have engendered considerable confusion among the
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B. Class Action Practice
Class action practice is not as confusing as class action doctrine.
In practice, the role of the class representative evokes little contro-
versy. Instead, there is a general recognition that the named plaintiff
is largely a figurehead who plays little or no part in the initiation and
prosecution of the class claim. 49
This recognition is part of a larger awareness that the class action
simply does not function like the traditional private-rights lawsuit
around which most common law jurisprudence and practice has de-
veloped. 0 The class action may have some similarity with the tradi-
tional lawsuit, in that the class representative occupies the position of
a traditional plaintiff or defendant, but that similarity is merely su-
perficial 5 1 As the Supreme Court stated in Geraghty, at heart the class
action is truly a "nontraditional" form of litigation.5 2
lower courts are (1) counterclaims against class members, and (2) future class actions. For a
discussion of the status of absent class members for purposes of counterclaims, see Steinman,
The Party Status of Absent Plaintiff Class Members: Vulnerability to Counterclaims, 69 GEo.
L.J. 1171 (1981). Professor Steinman notes that some courts hold that absent class members
are not "parties" for purposes of counterclaims unless and until they file damage claims,
while other courts take the position that absent class members who fail to opt out are "parties"
subject to counterclaims. Id. at 1175-79. For'a discussion of the Article III issues posed by
future class actions and the various ways in which the lower courts have handled these issues,
see Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 63 (1987).
49. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 656 (1987):
We begin by acknowledging the realities of class suits, a sometimes neglected
approach in this field. In a massive class action such as the one at hand, it is counsel
for the class who has the laboring oar. The class representatives furnish the factual
basis to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and provide the outline of the controversy,
but the lawyers shape the claims for adjudication by the compilation of factual and
expert testimony and the presentation of statistical and documentary evidence.
Id. at 124. See also Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973)
("Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties,
who direct and manage these actions. Every experienced judge knows that any statements to
the contrary is [sic] sheer sophistry.").
50. Professor Rosenberg argues that common law doctrine not only evolved around the
traditional two-party lawsuit, but that the common law holds out the traditional lawsuit as
the ideal form of litigation. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice
by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987).
51. Professor Chayes identifies five characteristics of the traditional model of litigation:
(1) it is "bipolar," i.e., "between two individuals" or "two unitary interests"; (2) it is
"retrospective"; (3) the "right and remedy are interdependent" in that "[t]he scope of relief
is derived more or less logically from the substantive violation"; (4) it is a "self-contained
episode" since "the judgment is confined to the parties"; and (5) "[t]he process is party-
initiated and party-controlled" with the judge acting as a "neutral arbiter." Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1976) [hereinafter
Chayes, The Role of the Judge]. See also Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25
Amuz. L. Rav. 3, 25-29 (1983) (discussing the individual's duty of initiative, the right not to
be solicited, and the right not to be represented).
52. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980).
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First and foremost, unlike the traditional model of litigation, which
involves a dispute between two private individuals with unitary in-
terests, 3 the class action is fundamentally a device to resolve the prob-
lems of a group of individuals.14 The class action is not an application
of rights, duties, and remedies to an individual case brought by a par-
ticular person seeking his day in court.5 Rather, as Professor Chayes
points out, the class action "is a reflection of our growing awareness
that a host of important public and private interactions ... are con-
ducted on a routine or bureaucratized basis and can no longer be vi-
sualized as bilateral transactions between private individuals. "56 A single
action or practice of a corporation or governmental agency may affect
hundreds or thousands of people. 7 The class action permits the af-
fected group to challenge the activity and to aggregate (and to some
extent average) their individual circumstances and interests in seeking
relief. 8 In doing so, moreover, the class action frequently seeks to
vindicate a political or social "right" (what some term a "public right")
rather than simply the "private right" envisioned by the traditional
litigation model.5 9
53. Under the traditional private-rights view, the purpose of the lawsuit is to determine
the rights of individuals and to protect concrete personal rights; Chayes, The Role of the
Judge, supra note 51, at 1282-83; Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1365-68.
54. For a thorough history of group litigation, see Yeazell, From Group Litigation to
Class Action 27 UCLA L. REv. 514, 1067 (1980) (pts. 1 & 2). Professor Yeazell argues that
the class action historically has been used as a stopgap, a temporary solution by groups on
the fringe of social recognition and political power who cease to need the class action once
they gain sufficient power to win legislation protecting their interests. Id. at 563. See also
Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 26-28 (class actions emphasize the concept of groups as
"right bearers" by being a form of political expression and a means of redressing political
and social concerns); Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1382 (in constitutional cases, class actions
"serve as 'public actions' vindicating broad public interests not protected under the traditional
private rights model").
55. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1382-83; Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 561-62.
56. Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 51, at 1291.
57. "Because of our mass economy, dominated by big businesses, monolithic governmental
structures, and burgeoning bureaucracy, it is not unusual for the decision or practice of one
government or corporate official to affect thousands or even millions of citizens." Kane, supra
note 8, at 91.
58. Rosenberg, supra note 50, at 562. See also, Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. Rav.
877, 906-07 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation] (discussing
the problem of "adverse selection" in class actions; namely, that persons with weaker claims
are likely to want the class action in order to hide the weaknesses of their individual cases,
while the claimants with strong cases may opt out of the class action so as not to be dragged
down by weaker claimants).
59. Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 27-28; Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1382; Yeazell,
supra note 54, at 1114-15. The term "public right" or "public action" refers to a right or
action brought by a private person primarily to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement
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A second major difference between the class action and the tra-
ditional litigation model lies in the role of the client. In traditional
litigation, the lawsuit is party-initiated and party-controlled: the dis-
gruntled client hires a lawyer to pursue the client's claim, and the client
monitors the lawyer's activities in prosecuting the lawsuit 0 The class
action, in contrast, typically is not initiated or controlled by the class
representative. In most class actions, the class attorney first finds the
class claim and then seeks out a client to be the class representative.6 1
The class attorney may use a "professional" class representative; he
may find the "client" through an informal "underground railroad"
network of referrals among class action attorneys; he may engage in
nationwide advertising to solicit a class representative.6 2 In addition,
the class attorney may switch from one class representative to another
as the case progresses and different characteristics in the class rep-
resentative are needed.63 Regardless of how the class representative is
chosen, the class attorney typically makes the decision to initiate the
suit, even in those cases in which the representative brings the claim
to the lawyer's attention. Furthermore, unlike the client in a tradi-
tional lawsuit, the class representative has little or no control over the
of public obligations. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?. 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818 n.11 (1969). See also Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5,
at 4-5;'Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 CoLum. L. Ray. 771 (1978).
Although the same injunctive relief obtainable in a class action is technically available
through an individual action, some commentators'argue that the class action is nonetheless a
better vehicle for litigating group-held public and private rights. Garth, Conflict and Dissent
in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. Rav. 492, 499-502 (1982); Kamp,
Adjudicating the Rights!of the Plaintiff Class: Current Procedural Problems, 26 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 364, 375-76 (1982); Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2)
Class Actions, 21 J.L. REFORM 347, 355-63 (1988).
60. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 51, at 1283; Dam, Class Actions:
Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 58
(1975); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 284.
61. A recent empirical study of class actions showed that the typical class lawsuit is not
initiated by an express client complaint or any overt dispute. Instead, the class action attorney
generally searches out a class claim (often by "piggybacking" on a government action) and
then finds a suitable class representative to be the nominal plaintiff. Garth, Nagel & Plager,
The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of
Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. Ray. 353, 375-77, 386-87 (1988).
62. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 3, at 632; Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLuIm. L. Rav. 669, 681-83 (1986) [hereinafter
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney]; Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation, supra note 58, at 885-86, 900; Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 325
(1986).
63. In their empirical study of class actions, Garth, Nagel, and Plager found that the
success of a class action lawyer largely depended on his abilities to search out the best class
representative and to shift from one named plaintiff to another as the case required. Garth,
Nagel & Plager, supra note 61, at 378-80.
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conduct of litigation once the class action has begun. Rather, as the
Third Circuit observed, the class lawyer carries the "laboring oar" in
shaping and presenting the case, and the class representative typically
provides no more than anecdotal testimony in deposition or trial. 64
This reversal of the traditional attorney-client roles in class actions65
stems from a number of factors. In part, the economics of the class
litigation dictate the change. Unlike the traditional lawsuit, in which
the client usually has a larger financial stake than his attorney,6 the
class attorney has a larger stake in the form of attorney fees than the
individual class member, who typically is going to recover a modest
sum, at best. 67 As Professor Coffee has noted, given these class action
economics, the class attorney inevitably acts as an entrepreneur, whose
decision to bring the class suit is essentially a capital budgeting de-
cision. 68 Furthermore, once the class action has begun, the class rep-
64. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 656 (1987), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988). See also Greenfield v.
Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Experience teaches that it is
counsel for the class representative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these
actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to the contrary is [sic]
sheer sophistry."); Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 308 (1980)
("In most small-claim class damage actions . . . plaintiff's counsel . . . is in reality the class
representative."); Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 58, at 877
(The notion that the client controls the class action is a "noble myth."); Kane, supra note 8,
at 113 ("[T]he attorney is truly the class representative.").
65. Whereas the traditional client-attorney arrangement is one of principal-agent with the
lawyer acting as agent, the lawyer in the class action assumes the role of principal or independent
entrepreneur. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 3, at 628-29; Coffee, Under-
standing the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 62, at 677-85.
66. The attorney may be working on a contingent fee arrangement, but still will receive
only a fraction of the client's recovery. Dam, supra note 60, at 58.
67. Berry, supra note 64, at 308; Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney, supra
note 62, at 677-78 (Professor Coffee notes that empirical studies confirm the common sense
conclusion that typically the representative party has a very small stake in the outcome of the
class action. Id. at 678 n.22.); Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra
note 58, at 884. In many civil rights actions, the class members will have no economic interest
in the lawsuit, and accordingly, may be less likely to take an active role in supervising the
attorney. Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: Fools for Clients?, 4 Amf. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243,
245-46 (1980). Typically, the class attorney also bears the financial risk of loss. The class
attorney usually does not seek to recover costs from the class representative when the class
action is unsuccessful. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 58,
at 897-98; Underwood, supra note 44, at 804-09.
68. Professor Coffee contends that the class attorney will assess the question in terms of
the lawyer's opportunity costs, his expected return, and his level of risk aversion. Coffee, The
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 12. See also Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 3,
at 627-29 (class actions may evoke an enhanced "agency cost problem" between the principal
and the agent; for example, the cost of agent monitoring and advertising, "bonding cost,"
and "unavoidable residual cost"); Dam, supra note 60, at 60 (arguing that attorneys in most
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resentative, having a relatively small financial stake in the lawsuit, is
unlikely to invest much time or effort in'monitoring the litigation. 69
Instead, the attorney, who has the greater financial interest, will make
the litigation decisions unfettered by an intruding client.70 The class
attorney may even seek out a compliant class representative to avoid
client intrusion.7 1 And even if a class representative wishes to take an
active role in the case, he may not be able to do so. Many important
decisions in a class action involve complex, procedural matters-de-
cisions that have low visibility but demand a high level of sophisti-
cation and expertise to understand and monitor. 72
The class action also differs from traditional private-rights liti-
gation in that there is not always a unity of interest on the class side
of the case. Rather, because the judge frequently can choose between
a range of remedies in a class action (unlike the traditional lawsuit
in which the remedy typically is derived from the substantive viola-
tion),7 class members may hold differing views on litigation objectives
and particularly on remedies or terms of settlement. 74 For instance,-
class actions have a larger monetary stake in a lawsuit than the class members); Kane, Of
Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. Rav. 385,
395-96 (1987) (identifying several instances of settlements and their effects upon an attorney
representing a class).
69. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 58, at 884-85; Kane,
supra note 68, at 389; see also Kane, supra note 8, at 112-14 (a named plaintiff may have
only a limited interest in the litigation if, for example, the claim became moot or allegedly
was only injured by one member of a defendant class).
70. Only a class representative with a large individual stake in the lawsuit is likely to
have the interest and the resources to monitor the class attorney. Ironically, this class member
is most likely to opt out of the class action to avoid being brought down by other class
members with weaker claims. Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 3, at 633-34.
71. Id. at 643 ("[Tlhe 'entrepreneurial' attorney has little desire to represent ... an
active, concerned client and, at least in theory, should prefer a more passive client less able
or willing to monitor him."). A recent survey confirmed that "there [is] very little if any
active attempt by lawyers to organize class members to participate in the suit or to engage in
other activities complementary to the suit." Garth, Nagel & Player, supra note 61, at 380-81.
72. Bergman, supra note 67, at 247; Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation,
supra note 58, at 884. Moreover, even a diligent class representative may get worn out by the
length of time that it takes to prosecute a class action. Bergman, supra note 67, at 270.
In addition, the law does not permit the representative to have complete control over the
litigation. Rather, both the class attorney and the class representative are charged with being
fiduciaries for the. class, and the class attorney may be permitted in some cases to take steps
over the objection of the named plaintiff. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 899-
900 (2d Cir. 1972) (class lawyer can settle over objections of representative); Dam, supra note
60, at 59; Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 1183, 1203-04 (1982);
Strickler, Protecting the Class: The Search for the Adequate Representative in Class Action
Litigation, 34 DE PAUL L. Rav. 73, 128 (1984).
73. In a two-party breach of contract action, for instance, the plaintiff is entitled, as a
remedy, to those damages that flow foreseeably from the breach. See e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-708
to -710 (1978).
74. For discussions of the problem of class conflicts, see Garth, supra note 59, Rhode,
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in a school desegregation case, various members of the class of black
parents may favor different injunctive or settlement structures. 75 Thus,
inherent in the class action is the very real potential for a conflict of
interest between the class representative and some segment of the class. 76
Finally, the role of the judge is significantly different in class lit-
igation than in the traditional two-party lawsuit. While in the tra-
ditional lawsuit the judge plays only a passive, neutral role, the judge
in the class action typically takes on a more activist role in supervising
and guiding the litigation. 77 In part, judges in class actions are re-
sponding to a perceived need to protect absent class members, some
of whom may have a conflict of interest with the named plaintiff or
class counsel;78 in part, the complexity of the class action may dictate
a more active judicial involvement. 79 Regardless of the cause, the Su-
preme Court recently noted, once the class complaint is filed the dis-
trict court has a "managerial responsibility." 80 Indeed, according to
supra note 72, and Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 37 (1982). Professor Rhode argues that "as a practical matter, once a class is
certified, the named plaintiffs generally are neither highly motivated nor well situated" to deal
with conflicts in the class. Rhode, supra note 72, at 1203.
75. See Garth, supra note 59, at 518-19; Rhode, supra note 72, at 1188-89. Professor
Rhode has noted:
Dispute has centered on the relative importance of integration, financial resources,
minority control, and ethnic identification in enriching school environments. Con-
stituencies that support integration in principle have disputed its value in particular
settings where extended bus rides, racial tension, or white flight seem likely concom-
itants of judicial redistricting. Some minority administrators, teachers, and parental
organizations have opposed interdistrict remedies that would close minority schools
or dilute minority control. Even class members who accept the necessity of some
busing will often divide on the merits of particular desegregation plans, which involve
disproportionate burdens on minority students or transportation of primary grade
students.
Id. at 1189 (footnotes omitted).
76. Indeed because of this potential conflict, client control in the class action may be
undesirable. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176-77 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (decision to appeal cannot rest entirely with either
named plaintiffs or class counsel); Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra
note 58, at 877 n.2.
77. Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 51, at 1284; Kennedy, supra note 51, at
25-29. Wilton, supra note 74, at 40-46.
78. The lower courts have been particularly careful to protect the absent class members
when the named plaintiff seeks to settle his individual claims and drop the litigation. See supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
79. There are many types of complex class actions. Typical examples include school
desegregation, employment discrimination, prisoners' rights, welfare reform, antitrust, securi-
ties, and mass tort claims. See 3 & 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, §§ 17-25 (collecting cases).
80. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486 (1989) (holding that the
district court may facilitate notice to potential class members in an opt-in class). The Court
further noted that "[o]ne of the most significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained
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the Court this activist role is one that the judge must assume in a class
action: "Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both
the duty and broad authority to exercise control over a class action
and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and
parties."81
The small role actually played by the class representative in the
prosecution of the class lawsuit is reflected in the approach taken by
courts in determining whether the proposed named plaintiff is an
"adequate" representative for Rule 23 certification purposes. 2 While
courts pay lip service to this part of the certification decision, they
spend little or no time evaluating the named plaintiff's knowledge of
the claims or willingness and ability to monitor the lawsuit. s3 Instead,
the courts essentially have reduced the test for adequacy to just two
requirements: (1) there can be no known conflicts between the rep-
resentative and the class;4 and (2) class counsel must be competent . 5
And this second requirement, which is given at least equal weight by
the courts, does not look to the class representative, but to the ad-
equacy of the class attorney.86
Thus, class action practice confirms what class action doctrine has
recognized only sporadically: The class lawsuit and the class repre-
sentative do not function according to the traditional private-rights
model. Unlike the traditional client, the class representative plays little
in recent years is the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the management
of litigation." Id. at 487. See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New-Role
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAlF. L. REv. 770 (1981) (discussing the
need for activist judges in all litigation).
81. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (emphasis added).
82. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(4). The Rule requires the district court to find that "the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
83. While some courts look to see whether the named plaintiff has some understanding
of the class claims, others hold that simply having a "keen interest" in the litigation suffices.
Bergman, supra note 67, at 258-59; Underwood, supra note 44, at 788-89. In part, courts may
be recognizing that 'if they demand too much of the named plaintiff, no "adequate" repre-
sentative will be producible and many wrongs may go unredressed. Grosberg, Class Actions
and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRAcusE L. REv. 709, 737-38 (1989).
84. Some courts hold that a potential conflict of interest will not disqualify a class
representative. 1 H. NEWBERO, supra note 2, § 3.25 (collecting cases); 7A C. WViUOHT, A.
MLLER & M. KANm, supra note 2, § 1768, at 359-60.
85. Bergman, supra note 67, at 252-58; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 3.22 (collecting
cases). This test is derived from Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir.
1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), and was echoed by the Supreme Court
in General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
86. One commentator has observed that "the single most important factor considered by
the courts in determining the quality of the representatives' ability and willingness to advocate
the cause of the class has been the caliber of the plaintiff's attorney." Symposium on Class
Actions, the Class Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. U.L. REv.
1133, 1136 (1974). See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 3.24 (collecting cases).
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part in initiating or shaping the case. Instead, the class attorney con-
trols the litigation, presenting the class claims; the representative pro-
vides no more than an anecdotal example of the class claim.
Furthermore, unlike traditional private-rigl.ts litigation, the class ac-
tion carries with it substantial risk of a c6nflict of interest between
the class representative and some segment of the class. Because of this
potential conflict and the complexity of class litigation, judges have
naturally assumed, and ultimately been charged with, more activist
roles than those taken in traditional litigation.
II. The Solution: Elimination of the Class Representative
Given the confused state of class action doctrine and the diluted
if not nonexistent role actually played by the class representative, we
must ask: Do we really need the class representative? Could the class
action function, doctrinally and practically, without him? If so, what
modifications to the class action rules would have to be made? In
analyzing these issues, we must continually consider the skeptic's res-
ponses and, in particular, his legitimate retort: Even if the class rep-
resentative serves only a modest role, what is the harm in keeping him?
A. What Does Elimination of the Class Representative Do to Class
Action Doctrine?
The class representative is, in large part, simply a throwback to
the traditional two-party model of litigation. The class representative,
as the named plaintiff, makes the class action resemble the traditional
lawsuit with which we are comfortable and familiar." When we look
to the class representative to satisfy standing and jurisdictional re-
quirements, we are asking the representative to do what the traditional
party in the nonclass lawsuit must do."8 While this approach in some
sense may make us feel comfortable, we should ask ourselves whether
87. As Professor Parker and Stone remarked in their discussion of public law litigation:
"The naming of an individual as plaintiff is basically a concession to tradition." Parker &
Stone, supra note 59, at 772.
88. Professor Sunstein argues that in the traditional private-rights lawsuit standing ques-
tions rarely arise and are easily resolved. The question of the private plaintiff's standing is
simply another way of asking whether the law has created a cause of action for someone in
the plaintiff's circumstances. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1434. See also Chayes, Foreword,
supra note 5, at 8-9 (standing issues rarely emerged because historically, in private party
actions, the plaintiff's standing to sue fused with whether the plaintiff maintained a cause of
action on the merits); Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 51, at 1290 (issues of a
plaintiff's standing to sue stemming from the early code pleading rules were rare since a
"plaintiff's standing merged with the legal merits").
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we are not simply trying to force the class action into a mold in which
it will never fit.89
A fundamental point to recognize is that the Constitution does
not mandate a traditional private-rights model of litigation.90 Article
III requires a case or controversy, but does not dictate who must be
party to the case or controversy. 91 Due process requires adequacy of
representation before absent class members can be bound by a judg-
ment, but does not dictate who must provide such adequate repre-
sentation. 92
Insofar as standing and mootness issues are concerned, the Sosna-
Geraghty line of cases demonstrates that these issues can be analyzed
in class actions by focusing not on the named plaintiff but on the class
and absent class members. The issue then becomes whether the class
has a live, concrete claim against the defendant. 93 Quite simply, the
class can provide the "concrete adverseness" and any "personal stake"
needed for Article III standing purposes. 94 And as Geraghty illustrates,
this focus on the class and virtual elimination of the class represen-
89. See, Chayes, The Role of the Judge, supra note 51, at 1291 ("I think it unlikely that
the class action will ever be taught to behave in accordance with the precepts of the traditional
model of adjudication."); Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1383 ("Perhaps more than any other
single development, the mushrooming of class actions has rendered the private rights model
largely unintelligible.").
90. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1368-72.
91. As Professor Monaghan states: "[Iln a document intended 'to endure for ages to
come,' this ['case or controversy'] language [of Article III] cannot mean that we are frozen
to the judicial ,forms and proceedings understood by the judges at Westminster." Id. at 1372.
See also, Fletcher, supra note 5, at 248 (arguing that "who" brings the case is not part of
the "case or controversy" requirement); Greenstein, supra note 8, at 919 (indicating a court
appointed guardian ad litem may not necessarily have a personal stake in the controversy).
92. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
93. See supra notes 4-48 and accompanying text. In his concurring opinion in Deposit
Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (the companion case to Geraghty), Justice
Stevens argued that once a class action complaint is filed, the unnamed class members should
be regarded as parties for Article III purposes. Id. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also
Greenstein, supra note 8, at 911-15 (debating whether a class has legal status prior to
certification); Note, Class Standing and Class Representative, 94 HA v. L. Rav. 1637, 1647-
50 (1981) (advocating that the putative class as a whole should be viewed as the plaintiff and
as such must meet the jurisdictional requirement of showing concrete injury to present a
justiciable controversy).
94. A number of commentators, in analyzing standing in general, have argued that the
"personal stake" requirement is a poor way to assure vigorous advocacy and is not necessary
for "concreteness" or Article III "case or controversy" purposes. See, e.g., Berger, supra
note 59, at 817-29; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. RaY. 1033, 1034-40 (1968); Monaghan, supra, note 5, at
1370; Scalia, The 'Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,'
17 SurroLK U.L. Rnv. 881, 891 (1983); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1474; Tushnet, The Sociology
of Article IP A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HAzv. L. REv. 1698, 1706-09 (1980).
In addition, some commentators contend that in public interest litigation, a traditional plaintiff,
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tative is possible in both the precertification and postcertification set-
tings. In addition, these decisions show that the absent class members
can be "adequately represented" and protected for due process pur-
poses before and after certification even though the named plaintiff
no longer has a personal stake in the controversy. Regardless of when
a standing or mootness issue arises, these concerns can be analyzed
by asking: Does the class have a live, concrete claim? Has the issue
become moot for the class? 9 Is someone protecting the class's interest?
Indeed, the lower court cases reinforce the feasibility of focusing
on the class and absent class members in the standing and mootness
area. 96 While the case law is anything but consistent, some lower courts
have recognized that standing and mootness issues in three major areas
of class action jurisprudence-precertification mootness, post-trial in-
adequacy, and precertification settlement-can be resolved by using
a Sosna-Geraghty, class-oriented approach. In doing so, the peculiar
circumstances of the named plaintiff are largely ignored, and the focus
shifts to the interests of the absent class members and the harm they
may suffer if the action is dismissed or settled.
Our skeptic responds: The Sosna-Geraghty line of cases and the
lower court cases following their approach only show that from a doc-
trinal viewpoint we can handle standing and mootness issues without
a class representative. What about class action doctrine outside the
standing and mootness area? Don't we need a class representative there?
The answer is yes and no. In some areas, the class action doctrine
already focuses on the class, and eliminating the class representative
would have no effect. For instance, since each class member, including
absent ones, must meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, the
class representative has no special role in this regard. 97 Similarly, the
absent class members are protected for statute of limitations purposes
from the time the class complaint is filed.98
with his own individual claim, is not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Berger, supra note
59, at 840; Jaffe, supra, at 1033-34; Parker & Stone, supra note 59, at 775.
95. When the issue has become moot for all or a substantial portion of the class, a
dismissal for mootness would be appropriate. This was the situation in Kremens v. Bartley,
431 U.S. 119 (1977), in which a class action challenged state commitment procedures for
mentally ill juveniles; the state promulgated new regulations before class certification and
enacted an entirely new statute after the class had been certified. Id. at 122-27. The Court
held that in such a case, when the claim was mooted for the entire class or a substantial
portion of the class, the entire case was moot despite certification. Id. at 129. Under my
proposal, Kremens would remain good law.
96. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
97. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
98. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Additionally, United
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In other areas-most notably diversity jurisdiction, personal ju-
risdiction, and exhaustion of some administrative remedies-some
modification of current class action doctrine would be necessary if we
eliminated the class representative. Currently, the courts look pri-
marily to the class representative to satisfy these requirements." While
this appears to give the named plaintiff an important role, in actuality
the courts are saying that these requirements are met if any member
of the class can satisfy them. The only trick is finding that class mem-
ber and giving him the title "class representative." The same result
could be achieved without a class representative by asking the question
directly: Is there any member of the class who can satisfy these re-
quirements?
B. What Does Elimination of the Class Representative Do to Class
Action Practice?
The short answer is that elimination of the class representative
would have only a negligible effect on class action practice. In practice,
the class representative plays a very minor role. The class attorney
fashions the claim, decides on strategy, presents the evidence, and rep-
resents the interests of the class. 100
C. What is the Advantage in Eliminating the Class Representative?
At this point our skeptic is saying: All right, suppose doctrinally
and practically we do not technically "need" a class representative.
The class representative may be a throwback to the traditional model
of litigation, but what do we gain by eliminating him?
Eliminating the class representative would result in less confusion
and inconsistency in class action doctrine. With the current coexistence
of both the Jacobs and Sosna-Geraghty lines of cases, the role of the
class representative has taken on a "now you see it, now you don't"
aura. By embracing the Sosna-Geraghty approach and taking it to its
logical conclusion-the elimination of the class representative-we can
begin to develop a coherent, unified class action jurisprudence.
The skeptic replies: If you want logical consistency, why not keep
the class representative and eliminate the Sosna-Geraghty approach?
Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), gives the absent "class member" of an uncertified
class the right to intervene in order to appeal the denial of class certification.
99. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 49-86 and accompanying text.
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Would not keeping the class representative and the Jacobs approach
be less disruptive than your proposal?
Admittedly, for purposes of logical consistency, which of the two
approaches is chosen is less important than the fact that one is chosen.
The advantage, however, of the Sosna-Geraghty approach is that it
recognizes that class litigation does not fit within the traditional lit-
igation model. Keeping the class representative is more than a harmless
throwback to the traditional bipolar model of litigation; it is, as Pro-
fessor Parker and Stone have stated, a "costly anachronism."''0 The
costs are two-fold. 102 First, the naming of a class representative may
divert the court's attention from the real problems associated with
class litigation. It may lull a court into believing that, as in a tra-
ditional lawsuit, the named plaintiff has meaningful client control over
the class attorney. It also may foster the illusion that the class is uni-
fied and represented in some democratic sense by the class represen-
tative.103 Neither scenario is likely to be true. The class representative
is at best a volunteer, and at worst a solicited puppet of the class law-
yer. Moreover, there may be conflicts within the class, and the "rep-
resentative" may not represent the interests of the entire class at all
points in the lawsuit. Yet the illusion of a traditional lawsuit created
by the class representative may keep the court from focusing on these
problems and obscure the reality of the class action: that it is fun-
damentally litigation by and for a group and thus operates differently
from the traditional two-party lawsuit.1 4
Without the class representative, the court's focus in a class action
properly will shift to the class. And without the illusion of a traditional
lawsuit, there is a greater chance that courts will recognize that the
doctrines developed in the traditional nonclass cases cannot be simply
transplanted into the class action. Instead, courts might begin the long
101. Parker & Stone, supra note 59, at 772.
102. See id. at 780-81 (arguing that the application of the traditional standing doctrine in
public law litigation imposes similar costs upon the remediation process).
103. As Professor Chayes noted, the tendency to force the class action into the mold of
the bipolar lawsuit and the unexamined assumption that the named plaintiff is in control of
the lawsuit may lead a court to assume unity within the class and divert the court's attention
from the real need for effective communication between the class attorney and class members.
Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 37, 45. Wilton echoes the same thought. Wilton, supra
note 74, at 48-52.
104. As Professor Coffee explains, "the choice is between truth and illusion. We [can]
continue to pretend that the class representative is the true party in interest, or we [can]
recognize the reality of the attorney as entrepreneur." Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepre-
neurial Litigation, supra note 58, at 899. Professor Hutchinson argues that we should retain
the class representative because doing so "rejects the reality" of the class lawyer as the real
party in interest. Hutchinson, supra note 27, at 502. My proposal, unlike Hutchinson's, comes
down firmly on the side of reality and the need to deal directly with that reality.
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overdue task of constructing a class action jurisprudence specifically
tailored to address the peculiar problems of class litigation. Courts
might focus directly on questions such as: Under what circumstances
should we permit a class action to be brought or continued? How can
we assure that there will be some meaningful supervision of the class
lawyer? How can we increase the likelihood that conflicts within the
class will be brought to the court's attention? How should we handle
settlements by less than all members of the class?
The existence of the class representative not only masks these real
problems, it also wastes judicial and lawyer resources on phantom
issues. Currently, courts spend an inordinate amount of time grappling
with what are often hair-splitting questions: Does the named plaintiff's
changed circumstances destroy his "personal stake" in the litiga-
tion?105 Does the named plaintiff continue to have a "live" claim?1°6
If not, has the case proceeded far enough for the class's personal stake
to take over? 07 Is the claim one that is capable of repetition for the.
105. Chayes, Foreword, supra note 5, at 45. The "personal stake" required of a plaintiff
has become so diluted through the years that, as Professor Monaghan remarked, "the most
trivial interest will suffice." Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1382. See also Nichol, supra note 5,
at 75 (discussing the "liberalization" of the injury-in-fact standard to include intangible and
subjective claims as well as abstract and widely-shared claims).
106. If the court finds that the named plaintiff has a "live" issue, the court can avoid
dismissing the case. Courts therefore will search to find such an interest. See, e.g., Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (class representatives who had been paid the
full amounts of their claims continued to have "personal stakes" in the class certification
issues because they might be able to shift some litigation costs to the class if they prevailed).
See also McKinnon v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 1984) (A claim for
money damages alleging certain conditions in a county jail is not moot because the class
representative was transferred from the jail.); Jordon v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d
1311, 1316 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 (1982) (In an employment
discrimination case, a settlement agreement entered into by the named plaintiff in the absence
of a certified class did not render the action moot. "[T]he attempt by several members of the
putative class to intervene as party plaintiffs clearly demonstrates the existence of a live
controversy.").
A related question that has consumed considerable time and effort of courts is what to do
with 'a named plaintiff who loses on his individual claim after class certification has been
denied. Can he still be the class representative for purposes of appealing the denial of class
certification? If not, what is the district court's duty in helping to find a new representative?
See Floyd, Civil Rights Class Actions in the 1980's: The Burger Court's Pragmatic Approach
to Problems of Adequate Representation and Justiciability, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 40-51
(collecting cases).
107. There seems to be no end to the questions that can arise in this area. See, e.g., Reed
v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1988) (The question was whether, in the case of
precertification mootness, the class lawyer may engage in discovery to find a new class
representative. The court held that it could not because without a "live" named plaintiff,
there was no case.); Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177, 1183-84 (7th Cir. 1984) (the issue was
whether Gerstein applied when the class claim was inherently transitory and capable of repetition
for the class, but the named plaintiff's individual claim was declared moot before he moved
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class, yet likely to evade review?"°8 Analyzing such issues takes sub-
stantial judicial and lawyer resources, but does nothing to answer the
real question: Is there a concrete, class-wide claim that the class wants
decided? 1°9 By eliminating the class representative, we also eliminate
the galaxy of phantom issues that his presence as the "named plain-
tiff" engenders"0 and achieve some much-needed judicial economy."'
D. What Changes Would Be Required to Enact this Proposal?
Our skeptic now smiles and says: Even if we do not "need" a
class representative, and even if there might be some advantages to
eliminating him, you are just theorizing. Would not your proposal,
if actually carried out, require a massive rewriting of Rule 23?
Eliminating the class representative admittedly would require some
changes in the certification procedure and in the evaluation of stand-
for class certification; the court held that Gerstein did not apply). But cf. Hoffmann-La Roche
v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486-88 (1989) (a district court may facilitate the identification of
and notice to class members of an opt-in class, even though they are not "parties" to any
"case" until and unless they do opt in).
108. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 2, § 2.19 (collecting cases). As Professor Greenstein has
remarked, it is not at all clear how "repetition and evasion" enhance or create Article III
jurisdiction. Greenstein, supra note 8, at 903. The answer to the traditional Article III
question-whether the class representative has a personal stake in the outcome of the case-
in no way changes because the claim is capable of repetition, yet evading review. If the class
can provide the personal stake for Article III purposes only after certification, then logically,
before-certification mootness of the representative's claim should demand dismissal of the
action, regardless of any repetition or evasion claim.
109. In Geraghty, the Supreme Court framed the question as follows: Is there a "sharply
presented issue[] in a concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating
opposing positions[?]" United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
110. In light of Gerstein and Geraghty, there is a real question whether the insistence on
a class representative with a "live" claim serves any function other than eliminating some
class actions that courts find "undesirable" on the merits. Put another way, decisions on
standing easily can become concealed decisions on the merits. By using standing to disguise
decisions on the merits of the claim, however, we permit the lower court to dismiss the class
claim without explaining what is substantively lacking from the allegations, and we largely
insulate the lower court's decision from reversal on appeal. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 663-
64 (arguing that many standing decisions in general have become concealed decisions on the
merits).
11. Moreover, lawyers no longer would have to go through the formalism of substituting
one named plaintiff for another whenever mootness questions arose or even worse, bringing
duplicative lawsuits. The unnecessary and ultimately meaningless expenditure of time and effort
is illustrated by Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the Supreme Court
applied the traditional standing approach to a representative action and held that the Sierra
Club lacked standing because the club had alleged no direct injury to itself or its members.
After years of litigation regarding the club's "personal stake" in the lawsuit, the club was
allowed to amend its complaint to add additional parties who did have standing. Sierra Club
v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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ing, mootness, and certain jurisdictional issues. These changes, how-
ever, could be accommodated with relatively modest adjustments to
the existing class action procedures.
First, without a class representative, the action would be brought
in the name of the class. All standing questions would merge into the
class certification issue. 12 Instead of resolving standing issues by look-
ing at the particular circumstances of one class member, the district
court would ask the more fundamental question: Is there a sharply
defined issue presented in a concrete factual setting that the parties
want resolved? To answer this question, the district court would in-
quire whether there was a class of persons who have a personal stake
in this issue and who would want this issue decided. In addressing
these questions, the court would necessarily be handling the class cer-
tification issue under Rule 23."1 The court would inquire whether the
class claim truly was common to the "class" being proposed" 4 and
whether there was a sufficient number of persons in that class to jus-
tify the use of the class action procedure." 5
In addition, the district court would continue, as under existing
Rule 23, to ascertain whether the proposed action fails within one of
the three categories described in Rule 23(b). 1l6 In particular, if a Rule
112. See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 236-39 (arguing that in all cases standing considerations
should be seen as part of the decision on the merits). See also, Parker & Stone, supra note
59, at 774-75 (arguing that standing should not be treated simply as a threshold requirement
but should be considered with the merits and particularly at the remedial stage of the litigation).
113. Some commentators have argued that the present certification procedure is flawed
and in need of change. See Berry, supra note 64, at 302-06; Greenstein, supra note 8, at 908-
09.
114. To the extent that General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-57
(1982), requires that there be a class claim, as opposed to an individual instance of discrimi-
nation, it would remain good law.
115. Rule 23(a) currently sets forth the threshold requirements that any action must meet
in order to be certified as a class action. It provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a). Under my proposal, inquiries (1) and (2) would still be made. Inquiries
(3) and (4) would be eliminated in their present form.
116. In addition to meeting the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, a purported class action also must
meet the requirements of one of the three (b) subcategories. Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes a class
action when necessary to prevent possible adverse effects on absent class members or the party
opposing the class that might arise if individual lawsuits were prosecuted. Rule 23(b)(2) permits
class actions when the party opposing the class has acted in a way that affects all class
members in a similar way and injunctive or declaratory relief is sought for the class. Rule
DECORATIVE FIGUREHEADSNovember 1990]
23(b)(3) class were being proposed, the court also would inquire into
such matters as the interests of individual class members in bringing
separate actions, the status of any individual actions already filed, the
desirability of combining all litigation into one forum, and the man-
agement problems likely to be encountered in a class action.11 7 The
only questions deleted from the inquiry would be those directed to the
class representative."' 8
But how, our skeptic asks, will a district court be certain that the
proposed class claim is concrete? If he does nothing else, the class
representative assures the court that it is not deciding an abstract and
theoretical question. Without a class representative, the class attorney
becomes a roving ideological plaintiff, free to interfere in matters that
do not concern him and about which those directly affected have not
complained." 9
While concreteness is certainly a valid concern, it can be assured
without resurrecting the class representative.' 20 Specifically, it can be
assured by requiring that the class attorney present to the district court
some "exemplary class members" during the certification process.
23(b)(3) authorizes a class action when common questions predominate and the class action is
superior to other available methods for resolving the dispute.
117. Rule 23(b)(3) provides that an action meeting the 23(a) requirements may be maintained
as a class action if, in addition:
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desir-
ability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
Id. 23(b)(3). Under my proposal, all the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiries would be made.
118. Specifically, Rule 23(a)(3) and (4) would be dropped (or at least restructured).
119. Professor Brilmayer argues that the requirement of a traditional personal-stake plaintiff
in public interest litigation insures that the courts are not interfering in a matter about which
no one is complaining. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HAiv. L. REv. 297, 310-15 (1979). See also Floyd, The
Justiciability Decisions of the Berger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862, 909 (1985) (the
Burger Court refused to stray from the traditional plaintiff "concrete adverseness" theory by
allowing a public interest organization to bring suit based upon advocacy interests); Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 1462 (the Administrative Procedure Act requirement of injury-in-fact further
deters the possibility of outsiders "disrupt[ing] mutually benefitial arrangements").
120. Some commentators argue that the roving ideological plaintiff is a fiction. See, e.g.,
Parker & Stone, supra note 59, at 775 (courts have no standards for assessing which plaintiff
is most representative of the affected class); Scott, supra note 5, at 674 ("The idle and
whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a specter which haunts the legal
literature, not the courtroom.").
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These exemplary class members would demonstrate that: (1) the class
issue presented in the complaint indeed had arisen in specific, concrete
instances; (2) there are class members who want the issue resolved;
and (3) there are class members who can fulfill any necessary juris-
dictional or administrative requirements. Moreover, the district court
could adjust the number of exemplary class members required to match
the complexity and breadth of the claims in the particular case. 121 The
exemplary class members, however, would not be named plaintiffs,
and the fate of the action would not depend on the continued vitality
of their particular claims.'2
Our skeptic may ask about supervision of the class attorney. Is
it not likely that some class representatives provide some monitoring
of the class attorney, and is this not beneficial? Indeed, we do not
permit the class attorney to be the class representative precisely to avoid
giving the class attorney undue control over the class lawsuit.' 23
The answer is again yes and no. Yes, we want someone to monitor
and supervise the class attorney. But no, the class representative does
121. Our skeptic may ask: Is there not a separation of powers problem with your proposal?
Should not courts limit themselves to protecting individual rights rather than general social
interests? And in the class action, does the existence of the class representative not insure that
the court is so limiting itself? My response is that my proposal raises no separation of powers
problems. In reviewing the claims of the exemplary class members, the district court could
assure itself that there were individuals who had suffered concrete injury and that the claim
was capable of resolution by the courts. See Parker & Stone, supra note 59, at 782 (separation
of powers can be guarded by denying relief to persons whose relationships to the case are
deemed insufficient); Scalia, supra note 94, at 891 (arguing that standing requirements are not
meant to insure separation of powers but rather are meant to insure that someone with a
"concrete injury" is objecting to the law or practice); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1469-71
(separation of powers doctrine not intended to limit courts' protection to traditional or
individual rights).
Similarly, elimination of the class representative would not raise the specter of unconstitu-
tional "advisory opinions." As Professor Berger has pointed out, the advisory opinion doctrine
is meant to avoid advice to Congress before it acts; it does not dictate who must bring the
lawsuit after Congress has acted. Berger, supra note 59, at 816, 830-31; see also, Fletcher,
supra note 5, at 247; Monaghan, supra note 5, at 1373-74 (to avoid advisory opinions it is
only necessary to require that "petitioner present relevant facts in sufficiently concrete form");
Nichol, supra note 5, at 99-101 (The "political question" doctrine looks to the issue being
raised, not to the party raising it and is therefore separate from standing issues.). In any case,
because my proposal focuses on the class's stake and its requirement of exemplary class
members, there would be no threat of courts handing out advisory opinions.
122. If the individual claims of all exemplary members became moot, class counsel would
have to present new exemplary members to assure the court that the issue remained "alive"
for the class.
123. A particular concern is that the class attorney will sell out the class by agreeing to a
small damage recovery in return for a large fee. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534
F.2d 1085, 1089-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Bergman, supra note 67, at
249; Rock, Class Action Counsel as Named Plaintiff: Double Trouble, 56 FORDHAM L. Rnv.
111, 117-20 (1987); Underwood, supra note 44, at 791.
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not effectively achieve this monitoring. The class representative, often
chosen by the class attorney, typically does not have either the ability
or the inclination to monitor the class lawyer in any effective way.
A better approach would be to move away from the class rep-
resentative and deal directly with the problem at hand: how to assure
meaningful supervision of the class attorney given the financial re-
alities of the class suit. Under my proposal, the district court would
require that the class attorney present to the court "class monitors"
as part of the class certification process. 124 The job of these monitors
would be to supervise the activities of the class lawyer during the var-
ious stages of litigation. These class monitors need not be members
of the class, and therefore need not be the same persons who are pre-
sented as exemplary class members. 125 In many cases, the most ef-
fective monitor may be a nonmember organization with a special
interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. 126 Whether a class member
or not, the class monitor should possess certain key qualities such as
the time and sophistication (including knowledge of the economic re-
alities and substantive merits of the claims) to supervise actively the
class attorney in the planning and decision-making involved in the
lawsuit.
In reviewing the adequacy of the class monitors, the district court
would look specifically at their ability to monitor the class lawyer.
Furthermore, as with the exemplary class members, the district court
could vary the number of class monitors required to suit the com-
plexity of the case or the stage of litigation.127 In particular, the district
court could require that the class monitors be changed or increased
as the case progressed, replacing bored monitors and adding class
members with differing interests. 28
124. I apologize for the label. I realize that the name "class monitor" sounds like someone
who cleans erasers in grammar school.
125. The suggestion that nonclass members be appointed as monitors is not as far-fetched
as it might sound at first. More than one commentator has noted that nonclass organizations
might successfully be used to monitor the class lawyer. Chayes, Forward, supra note 5 at 45;
Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 58, at 900.
126. As a number of commentators have observed, the best monitors of class lawyers often
are organizations who are not class members, but who have an ongoing interest in the litigation.
Unlike many private individuals, they often have the sophistication and financial resources to
supervise a lawsuit over many years. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 5, at 680-81; Sunstein, supra
note 5, at 1448; Tushnet, supra note 94, at 1710-13 (discussing public interest litigation).
127. The requirement that the class attorney present exemplary class members and class
monitors at the certification stage (and increase or change them as the district court deems
necessary) avoids Professor Brilmayer's concern that dispensing with the traditional plaintiff
requirement will encourage the attorney to cut corners. Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 H~atv. L. REv.
1727, 1729-31 (1980).
128. Other commentators have noted that adequate representation (adequate class monitors,
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At this point, our skeptic may argue that my proposal is nothing
more than a shell game. It purports to eliminate the class represen-
tative, but in reality simply replaces him with "exemplary class mem-
bers" and "class monitors." If the class lawyer must come'forward
with exemplary class members and class monitors, why not just name
these people as class representatives? 129 Or, if lawyer supervision is a
problem, why not keep the class representative and just have the dis-
trict court place more emphasis on his monitoring duties as part of
certification? 130
The benefit in this proposal goes far beyond a change in labels.' 3'
The benefit lies in unmasking some of the illusions fostered by the
existence of a class representative. On a doctrinal level, elimination
of the class representative takes us away from the notions that the class
action is brought and prosecuted by one person, that there is a single
"named plaintiff," or that the fate of a group's action rises and falls
with the fortunes of one individual. Although my proposal would add
under my proposal) is particularly important at the remedial stage of the class action. At the
remedy stage, the court often is faced with more than a liability decision in favor of or against
the plaintiff class. The court may well have to choose a remedy from among a number of
possible plans that could be designed to fit within the constitutional or statutory language.
Or, the court may be asked to approve a negotiated settlement in which the plaintiffs' and
defendants' counsel have fashioned a remedy. In either case, each of the different possible
remedial plans may have supporters among the affected class members, and therefore repre-
sentation at the bargaining table for each such subgroup within the class becomes critical. See
supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Parker & Stone, supra note 59, at 772;
Rhode, supra note 72, at 1188-89; Wilton, supra note 74, at 46-47. Furthermore, it is a reality
of life that given the duration of some class actions, monitors likely will become bored and
seek to be replaced. "All this occurs quite naturally because of the nature of class actions
themselves: they tend to be lengthy, procedurally complex and legally esoteric." Bergman,
supra note 67, at 247.
129. Professor Brilmayer raises this question in discussing the requirement for a traditional
plaintiff in public interest litigation. Brilmayer, supra note 127, at 1727-29.
130. Actually very few commentators propose increased scrutiny of the class representative.
Most recognize that the class representative has neither the ability nor motivation to supervise
the class counsel. Some commentators suggest that the district court scrutinize the conduct of
the class counsel more carefully. See, e.g., Grosberg, supra note 83, at 751; Kane, supra note
68, at 402-03. Some commentators have explored the possibility of using surveys of absent
class members or "town meetings" as means to insure that conflicting views within the class
are brought to class counsel's attention. See, e.g., Garth, supra note 59, at 515-18; Rhode,
supra note 72, at 1232-42; Wilton, supra note 74, at 66. Professor Coffee, who maintains that
only a representative with a large personal stake ever will monitor the class lawyer, suggests
that the court could limit the large claimant's right to opt out of the class.. Coffee, The
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 58, at 925-30. See also Ratliff, Offensive
Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEx. L. Rav. 63, 69 (1988) (discussing proposals
to limit opt-outs to maximize res judicata effect of class actions).
131. Eliminating the "class representative" label itself may be advantageous in that the
label is somewhat misleading. The 'representative" may not always represent the interests of
all members of the class.
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exemplary class members and class monitors, these entities would not
be presented individually as bringing the action. At most, they would
be members of the class prosecuting the action.
On a practical level, eliminating the class representative lessens
the likelihood that the district court will treat the class litigation simply
as a large traditional lawsuit. By replacing the class representative with
exemplary class members and class monitors, we encourage the district
court to deal directly with the peculiar problems posed by the class
action: Have the parties presented a class-wide issue? Is there someone
monitoring the class lawyer as he prosecutes this action? Are con-
flicting views within the class being heard by the class lawyer and the
court? i 2 In short, without the class representative, there is less like-
lihood the court will presume the existence of such factors as client
control, unity of interest within the class, and representation of all
views within the class when the class attorney speaks.
Additionally, use of exemplary class members and class monitors
who are not "named plaintiffs" may give the district court a greater
sense of flexibility. Should the "concreteness" of any aspect of the
class claim become less certain as the suit progresses, the court can
require additional exemplary class members. If the court at any time
becomes dissatisfied with the attorney supervision or concerned about
class conflicts, it can require additional or different monitors. And
by not limiting class monitors to class members, the district court has
a significantly better chance of getting adequate monitors. Under ex-
isting Rule 23, a court can request that additional or different class
representatives be named during the pendency of the action.133 Two
problems, however, hinder the use of this procedure under the existing
rules. First, any such substitute named plaintiff must intervene as a
party, and there may be a problem in meeting the requirements of Rule
24.14 Second, insofar as the existing class representative is presently
inadequate, the party opposing the class can argue that absent an ex-
isting adequate, representative, there can be no class and the entire
action must be dismissed. In other words, without a currently valid
class representative, no "class" can exist awaiting the appointment of
a new representative.'35 Under my proposal when the class monitors
132. Professor Coffee argues that class conflicts often do not surface partly because lawyers
"so totally dominate the process." Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 3, at 656.
133. Rule 23(d)(3) permits the court to issue orders "imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or on intervenors," and Rule 23(d)(5) authorizes orders "dealing with similar
procedural matters."
134. See FED. R. Crw. P. 24; see, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385
(1977).
135. See, e.g., Trevino v. Holly Sugar Corp., 811 F.2d 896, 906 (5th Cir. 1987) (when
representative loses her individual case on the merits, no class can be certified, even if the
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are not parties to the lawsuit and the class is the real party in interest,
neither of these problems arise.
E. Odds and Ends
Our skeptic now says: Maybe your proposal would take care of
major concerns like standing, mootness, and attorney supervision, but
there are still some other details to cover.
What do we do about discovery, particularly prior to class cer-
tification? Traditionally, the defendant has been permitted discovery
with respect to the claims of the class representative. 3 6 The answer
is that discovery before or after certification should be permitted against
the exemplary class members proffered by the class attorney. Indeed,
this approach has an advantage for the party seeking discovery in that
the district court can vary the number of exemplary class members
required with the breadth and complexity of the class claims.
What do we do, our skeptic asks, with disgruntled class members?
Under the present system they can move to intervene as plaintiffs in
the class action. If we eliminate the individual plaintiffs from the class
action, how do we assure that disgruntled class members, who do not
opt out of the class, are protected? The answer lies within the system
of class monitors. Any unsatisfied class member could petition the
court to be appointed a class monitor and to have his own attorney
kept informed of developments in the litigation. 37
What about the additional burden placed on the district court by
requiring it to appoint and review exemplary class members and class
monitors?' What happened to the judge as neutral arbiter? The short
original denial of class certification was erroneous); Roby v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 775 F.2d
959, 961-63 (8th Cir. 1985) (district court properly decertified class after trial indicated that
named plaintiffs were not subject to employment practices being challenged). But cf. Carpenter
v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 616-18 (5th Cir. 1983) (when class is successful
at trial but class representative is not, class does not have to be decertified); Goodman v.
Schlesinger, 584 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (4th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that when named plaintiff loses
his individual case, district court can "hold" case to see if a new representative comes forward).
136. Currently, discovery is permitted against the class representative because he is "the
named plaintiff" in the action. 2 H. NEwBERO, supra note 2, § 7.08. A more difficult question
under the existing law is whether the defendant is entitled to discovery against absent class
members. Here courts again get tangled up in abstract questions: Are the absent class members
also "parties" to the action? Does certification of the class change the answer? For a discussion
of how courts currently resolve these issues, see Underwood, supra note 44, at 825-26, and
7B C. WRiGHT, A. MMLER & M. KANE, supra note 2, § 1796.1.
137. Professors Steinman" and Wilton contend that the right of the absent class member
under the existing Rule 23 to intervene is a little-used right. Steinman, supra note 48, at 1203-
06; Wilton, supra note 74, at 58-60. The skeptic's concern over maintaining the absent class
member's right to intervene may be a concern more for a theoretical right than for a right
actually used in practice.
138. Our skeptic also might ask: Won't finding these exemplary members and class monitors
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answer here is that this ship has long since sailed. The growing trend
in class action litigation for some time has been close judicial man-
agement. 13 9 As the Supreme Court has noted, given the potential for
abuse and conflict in class litigation and the complexity of these cases,
the district court has not only the authority, but also the duty, to ex-
ercise active control. 140 The simple fact is that the class action is not
traditional litigation; the peculiar problems that arise in group liti-
gation require the court to take an active supervisory role.
III. Summary of Proposal
In sum, I propose to eliminate the class representative and treat
the class as the real party to a class action from the time the complaint
is filed. The class complaint now would name the class as the party
bringing the lawsuit, not an individual purporting to represent the class.
All standing and mootness questions, before and after class certifi-
cation, would become: Does the class have standing to assert this claim?
Has this claim become moot for the class or a sizable part of the class?
Moreover, the standing issue would merge into the class certi-
fication question. As part of deciding whether the class has standing
to assert the claim, the district court naturally would have to decide
whether there was a class of persons for whom this was a live and
concrete issue and whether the number of persons in that class was
sufficiently large to justify the use of the class procedure. In addition,
likely involve a good deal of communication between class counsel and members of the class,
possibly resulting in targeted solicitation by the class lawyer? There may well be increased
communication between the class and the class lawyer. As evidenced by Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), however, not all communication between class counsel and the
class membership is prohibited. Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, increased
communication with the class could be advantageous because both counsel and the court would
be more likely to discover conflicts within the class. Garth, supra note 59, at 533-34; Grosberg,
supra note 83, at 751; Wilton, supra note 74, at 66. With respect to the charge of solicitation,
my response is that attorneys currently engage in solicitation. See supra note 61 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been relaxing its position toward solicitation.
See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-47 (1985); Gulf Oil,
452 U.S. 89; Camisa, The Constitutional Right to Solicit Potential Class Members in a Class
Action, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 95 (1989-90) (discussing Gulf Oil and Zauderer). Solicitation may
even be desirable in a class action as one way of informing potential claimants of their rights.
Rhode, supra note 62, at 325.
139. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. See also Garth, supra note 59, at 515-
18 (asserting that "the trial court has a duty to uncover conflict and to handle it creatively");
Kane, supra note 68, at 402-03 (arguing that active judicial involvement is necessary in a class
action to discover conflicts within the class and to assure adequate monitoring of the class
counsel).
140. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 486-87 (1989); Gulf Oil, 452
U.S. at 100.
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in a Rule 23(b)(3) class proceeding, the court would continue to decide,
as it currently does, whether the common class issue predominates over
individual issues and whether the class procedure is superior to other
methods of adjudicating the issue. Any inquiry into the adequacy of
a class representative or comparison of the representative's claims with
the class claims (i.e., the inquiries of Rule 23(a)(3) and (4)) would be
eliminated.' 4'
Instead, the class attorney would be required to present exemplary
class members and class monitors as part of the certification process.
Exemplary class members would assure the district court that the class
issue presented in the complairit actually has arisen in real, concrete
instances and that members of the class want the issue resolved. In
addition, exemplary members would take the place of the class rep-
resentative for determining satisfaction of personal jurisdiction, di-
versity of citizenship, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Rather
than looking to one class representative to satisfy these jurisdictional
requirements, class counsel would present exemplary members to show
that some member of the class could satisfy any needed administrative
or procedural requirement.
The class monitors, who would not necessarily be the same per-
sons as the exemplary class members and might not even be class mem-
bers, would have the job of monitoring the class attorney. The burden
would be on the class to show that the proposed monitors were willing
and able to take on such a supervisory role. The district court would
have the authority to vary the number of exemplary class members
and class monitors required depending on the scope and complexity
of the case. In addition, the district court would be encouraged to
review the exemplary members and monitors as the case progressed
to ensure that there was continuing supervision of class counsel and
that conflicting interests within the class were being heard. Provided
the monitors were adequate, the class would be bound by the outcome
of the lawsuit.
Discovery would be directed at the exemplary class members; the
district court would have the authority to require the addition of ex-
emplary class members if necessary for adequate discovery. No changes
would be made in the existing procedures for giving notice to the class, 142
141. Alternatively, the inquiries in Rule 23(a)(3) and (4) can be seen as being redirected at
the exemplary class members and the class monitors, respectively. The exemplary class members
will have to show that the controversy is a real, concrete issue, and the monitors will have to
show that they can protect the class in supervising class counsel.
142. Although no change would be made in the procedure for giving notice to the class,
my proposal would acknowledge openly another reality of current class action practice: class
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for opt-outs and opt-ins,143 or for counterclaims against the class mem-
bers. 144 Any disgruntled class member who chose not to, or could not
opt out of the class, could petition to be added as a class monitor.
Conclusion
The time has come to think about the unthinkable: eliminating
the class representative. He serves no function in the actual prose-
cution of the class action. Yet his presence engenders confusion and
the proliferation of phantom issues in class action jurisprudence. Fur-
thermore, having a named plaintiff tends to obscure the fundamentally
nontraditional nature of the class action and to divert courts from
addressing directly the peculiar problems inherent in group litigation.
My proposal, with its use of exemplary class members and class mon-
itors, would help resolve these problems with minimal disruption of
class action doctrine and practice.
counsel advances the cost of notice to the class with recovery of the advanced amount
dependent upon the success of the action. Currently, some courts inquire into the ability of
the class representative to pay these costs as part of the class certification process. Berry,
supra note 64, at 310-11; Underwood, supra note 44, at 804-08. In reality, however, these
costs typically are advanced by class counsel and recovered from the class only if it succeeds
in the litigation. See authorities cited supra note 67. Furthermore, insistence on payment of
costs by the class representative serves only to make the class action impractical for the small
claimant, the very person the class action was meant to serve. Berry, supra note 64, at 311.
143. In most Rule 23(b)(3) actions, absent class members have the right to opt out of the
class, and if they do so, they are not bound by the judgment in the action. Absent such an
option out, all class members are bound by the judgment in the class lawsuit. See 7B C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 2, § 1787, at 209-13; see also Weber, supra note
59, at 385-87 (arguing that the "opt out" right should also be available for absent members
of a (b)(2) class). A few substantive statutes, however, provide that absent class members must
opt into the (b)(3) class in order to be bound by the judgment. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989) (discussing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602). Under my proposal, both the general opt-out rule
and any statutorily-mandated opt-in rule would remain the same.
144. Occasionally, a defendant will assert a counterclaim against absent class members.
Courts differ on how to handle those counterclaims. Steinman, supra note 48, at 1175-79.
Regardless of the procedure a court uses when faced with counterclaims, the elimination of
the named plaintiff will not affect such procedures. As Professor Steinman notes, the class
representative never does "represent" the absent class members with respect to counterclaims
filed against the class members. Id. at 1190-91.
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